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Introduction

Many decisions involve uncertainty about outcomes, such as how a consumer's diet and exercise regimen will aect long-term health, whether to purchase a shirt or pair of sneakers
from Amazon.com without knowing if they will t comfortably, and whether to open Door
number 2 or Door number 3 on a television game show in order to maximize the probability
of winning a new car. Many decisions also involve multi-dimensional outcomes. For instance,
the choice to order triple chocolate cheesecake for dessert may result in both utility from
consumption and disutility from gaining weight. The decision to speed may save time, but
may also result in personal injury. However, despite the ubiquity of decisions under uncertainty that involve non-nancial outcomes or multidimensional outcomes, the vast research
on decisions under risk has focused primarily on unidimensional monetary lotteries.
Going back at least as far as 1738 with Bernoulli's work on the St. Petersburg Paradox,
monetary lotteries have been the workhorse framework for understanding decisions under
risk.

Recent studies have tested whether people treat multidimensional risky choices the

same as unidimensional monetary lotteries and found systematic dierences. In particular,
revealed preferences over consumer goods are less risk-averse (DeJarnette, 2017) and more
consistent with expected utility theory (Arroyos-Calvera et al., 2018) than revealed preferences over monetary lotteries. These puzzling results cannot be explained by any standard
model of decision making.
We demonstrate that these ndings are predicted by a salience-based model of behavior
that also explains the classic anomalies for choices under risk. In particular, we generalize
the salience theory of Bordalo et al. (2012) to multidimensional outcomes. The essence of
our approach is to assume that, rather than grouping outcomes into `salient states,' individuals group outcomes into `categories.' The predictions of our model coincide with those
of salience theory when all outcomes are from a single category. Our approach thus links
to two fundamental concepts in psychology and behavioral economics  salience perception
and categorization to individual choices under risk. We refer to the resulting model as categorical salience theory (CST). CST adds no additional parameters to salience theory given
any categorization of outcomes, and it reduces to the Bordalo et al. (2012) salience model
when there is a single category. The CST model also has fewer parameters than cumulative prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992), while generating novel predictions that
more strongly distinguish it from prospect theory and other models of choice under risk than
are provided by salience theory for monetary lotteries.
After applying CST to basic choices between lotteries, we consider the implications of
CST for a variety of economic contexts. O'Donoghue and Somerville (2018) argue that three

2

of the primary applications for behavioral models of choice under risk should be nancial
markets, insurance markets, and principal-agent settings. We show how CST can explain
empirical puzzles in each of these domains: the higher demand for categorized insurance, the
eectiveness of non-monetary incentives in employment contracts, greater variety seeking in
simultaneous than in sequential choice, and naive diversication across nancial assets.
The paper is structured as follows.

Section 2 introduces the generalization of salience

theory to risky choices involving multidimensional outcomes. Section 3 applies this theory
to explain choices between lotteries over multidimensional outcomes. In particular, we apply
CST to explain dierences in risk preferences over money compared to goods from prior
experimental studies and report a new study examining risk preferences across categories of
goods to provide a direct test of CST. We then apply CST to dierent economic contexts
including portfolio choice (Section 4), insurance (Section 5), and employment contracts (Section 6). Section 4 also reports a new experiment documenting a preference for a 1/N rule in
portfolio choice in a manner predicted by CST. Section 7 concludes.

2

Salience Theory with Multidimensional Outcomes

To apply salience theory to the two empirical puzzles found in the literature, we rst introduce a general salience theory over multidimensional outcomes in which outcomes are
grouped into categories.

X denote the set of possible outcomes, and let ∆(X ) denote the set of lotteries over
X . Let % denote a preference relation on ∆(X ). Under expected utility theory (EU), risk
preferences are characterized by the following relationship: For all L1 , L2 ∈ ∆(X ),
Let

L1 % L2 ⇐⇒

X

L1 (x)u(x) ≥

x∈X
where

Lj (x )

X

L2 (x)u(x)

(1)

x∈X

is the probability of receiving outcome

x

from lottery

Lj ,

and

u

is a utility

function.
Model (1) is the standard model of rational choice under risk.

However, a range of

empirical tests have documented systematic ways in which observed behavior diers from
EU. One recent model developed to explain this empirical evidence is the salience theory
of choice under risk from Bordalo et al.

(2012).

To provide a psychologically grounded

explanation of the empirical violations of expected utility theory, Bordalo et al.

(2012)

propose that a choice between lotteries induces an endogenous state space, and they assume
that this state space is the `minimal state space' that arises if lotteries are statistically
independent.

They then decompose behavior into two stages.
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In Stage 1, in accordance

with the decision maker's salience perception, the decision maker ranks all pairs of outcomes
between two independent lotteries by a salience function,

σ.

discounts less salient states by a constant discount factor

In Stage 2, the decision maker

δ,

similar to how distant time

periods are discounted in models of intertemporal choice.
Formally, let

%̇|L

L := {L1 , ..., Ln },
choice sets by Θ. The

be a `perceptual' relation over lotteries in choice set

with the meaning `looks at least as good as'. Denote the set of all
relation

%̇

potentially diers from the preference relation

%

since

%̇

is inuenced by both

the preference relation over lotteries, and the `salience relation' (represented by the salience
function) over states. Hence, a decision maker might systematically deviate from preferences
in (1) due to the inuence of salience perception and instead choose the lottery that `looks
better'. In particular, for a given ranking of salient states, under the Bordalo et al. (2012)
salience model, a choice between two lotteries (i.e.,

L1 %̇|L L2 ⇐⇒

X

L := {L1 , L2 }),

is represented by:

δ s [u(x1s ) − u(x2s )]ps > 0.

(2)

s∈S
In (2),

S

is the set of salient states induced by choice set

by their salience according to a salience function,

j
and xs is the outcome in state

s

if lottery

Lj

σ, ps

L,

where the states are ranked

is the probability that state

is chosen. If there are

k

s

occurs,

states, the states are

ranked such that

σ(x11 , x21 ) > σ(x12 , x22 ) > · · · σ(x1s , x2s ) > · · · > σ(x1k , x2k ).
Hence the discount factor

δ

discounts less salient states exponentially. If

(3)

δ = 1,

then (2)

reduces to EU and (1) holds.
Bordalo et al. (2012) demonstrate that (2) can explain a variety of classical anomalies for
choices under risk (in particular, the Allais paradox (Allais, 1953), the common ratio eect
(Allais, 1953; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), and the fourfold pattern of risk preferences
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1992)), given plausible assumptions about the salience function
(that we present in Section 2.2).

Of course, although these three anomalies are three of

the most robust empirical violations of expected utility theory, they are each explained by
alternative models of choices under risk, including prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky,
1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992), disappointment theory (Bell 1985; Loomes and Sugden
1986), and regret theory (Bell 1982; Loomes and Sugden, 1982). To distinguish salience theory from these alternative models, Bordalo et al. (2012) make two additional observations:
(i) salience theory predicts the Allais paradox and common ratio eect to be reduced when
lotteries are correlated, and (ii) under additional plausible assumptions, salience theory can
explain the preference-reversal phenomenon of Lichtenstein and Slovic (1971). Although ob-
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servations (i) and (ii) are not explained by prospect theory or disappointment theory, they
can both be explained by regret theory. Bordalo et al. (2012) thus provide additional discussion suggesting that salience theory provides a better explanation of preference reversals
than regret theory. However, as noted, additional assumptions must be applied to salience
theory before it can explain preference reversals, and the ability of salience theory to explain
(i) and (ii) does not come for free. In particular, (cumulative) prospect theory satises both
stochastic dominance and transitivity  arguably the two most basic principles of rational
choice under risk. Neither of these normative properties is preserved in general by salience
theory, although salience theory does preserve stochastic dominance when lotteries are independent (Bordalo et al., 2012). Moreover, the essential property of a salience function 
diminishing (absolute) sensitivity, although rooted in psychology, is also at the heart of the
prospect theory value function.
In light of the preceding discussion, the question arises as to how salience theory enhances
our basic understanding of choices under risk. In this paper, we generalize the Bordalo et al.
(2012) salience theory to risky choices involving multidimensional outcomes. We demonstrate
that in this larger (and arguably more commonly encountered) choice environment, salience
theory generates novel predictions that cannot be explained by any of the conventional
models of choice under risk.

Moreover, the predictions are strong and systematic  the

reverse predictions do not hold.

We document empirical puzzles that provide a means of

investigating the predictions of this multi-dimensional salience theory, and we observe that
salience theory provides a resolution to each of these puzzles.
It has been recently shown by Herweg and Müller (2019) that the Bordalo et al. (2012)
salience theory is equivalent to a special case of regret theory (Loomes and Sugden, 1982;
Bell, 1982). This correspondence entails that our extension of salience theory developed here
can be alternatively interpreted as an extension of regret theory. We feel that our analysis
is more naturally motivated by the intuition of salience theory, but one could also develop
an alternative interpretation based on regret theory. Consequently, for a single category of
outcomes, our model inherits the predictions of salience theory and regret theory. Although
both models explain empirical ndings that cannot be explained by EU such as the Allais
paradoxes and the fourfold pattern of risk preferences, early direct tests of regret theory
have identied event-splitting eects that are not predicted by the model (e.g., Starmer and
Sugden, 1993). These ndings also contradict the Bordalo et al. salience theory. However,
more recent direct experimental tests nd support for salience theory (Bordalo et al., 2012;
Frydman and Mormann, 2018, Nielsen et al., 2018). For instance, Bordalo et al. (2012) and
Frydman and Mormann (2018) both observe shifts in the distribution of choices between
correlated and statistically independent lotteries in the direction predicted by salience theory.
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These ndings also support regret theory.

As we develop our approach motivated by the

intuition of salience theory, we refer to salience theory in the analysis to follow, keeping in
mind that in principle, there can be an alternative interpretation based on regret theory.

2.1

Categorical Salience Theory

Choices under risk often involve outcomes that dier in kind (i.e., are from dierent `categories'), such as choices between dierent types of nancial investments, dierent types of
consumer goods, or dierent types of employment opportunities). However, the workhorse
framework for studying decisions under risk has been unidimensional monetary lotteries 
that is, choices where all outcomes are monetary. It has then been implicitly assumed that
behavior for multidimensional lotteries where outcomes dier across categories is not systematically dierent from behavior for unidimensional monetary lotteries.

From a behavioral

economics perspective, it is not obvious that this tacit assumption should hold. One general
nding in the psychology literature is that people naturally think in terms of categories.
Indeed, one author even makes the strong claim that cognition is categorization (Harnad,
2017). It thus seems plausible that, rather than grouping outcomes into salient states, people group outcomes into categories. In particular, our main substantive assumption, and the
essence of our approach is to replace the Bordalo et al. (2012) state space and salience ranking across states, and assume instead that people process decisions by aligning outcomes by
their categories. We then apply the Bordalo et al. salience theory within categories, resulting in a more general model for multidimensional outcomes that we refer to as `categorical
salience theory' (CST). The CST model links two major concepts from psychology and behavioral economics  categorization and salience perception to decision making, it reduces to
the Bordalo et al. salience theory if there is only one category of outcomes, and it provides
explanations for two empirical puzzles that violate every standard theory of behavior.
Let outcomes in

X

be partitioned into

C

categories.

Each category

outcomes, and each outcome is included in precisely one category.

c∈C

has

m(c)

For each choice set,

L := {L1 , ..., Ln }, each outcome i ∈ c and each category c ∈ C , dene a category-outcome
j
1
n
vector, c ic := (xic , . . . , xic ) of dimension n. In each c ic , we let xic denote outcome i (c),
i (c) ∈ {1, 2, . . . , m(c)} from category c ∈ C that obtains if lottery Lj ∈ L is chosen. Risk
is modeled as a lottery over category-outcome vectors, where a category-outcome vector is
randomly selected for each category

c ∈ C . That is, each decision may simultaneously result

in multiple outcomes that dier categorically. Indeed, it is rare when a decision in the `real
world' results in only a single isolated outcome. If the decision maker can only choose one
lottery from

L,

then only one outcome in each category-outcome vector (the outcome from
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the chosen lottery) results from the decision.

However, multiple outcomes (one for each

category) may still result from the decision. Of course, many categories can have outcomes
of zero, where a zero outcome from a category
category

c

We let

c

indicates that nothing is gained or lost in

as a result of the decision.

pic

c ic is the randomly sei∈c pic = 1 for each c ∈ C . Under Categor-

denote the probability that category-outcome vector

lected vector of outcomes for category

c, where

P

12

ical Salience Theory (CST), model (2) is generalized to model

L1 %̇|L L2 ⇐⇒

XX

(4):

σc (xic1 , xic2 )[u(x1ic ) − u(x2ic )]pic > 0.

(4)

c∈C i∈c
Comparing (2) and (3), we note the following dierences: The two stages of generating a
salience ranking and then discounting less salient states is merged into a single stage in which
the discount factor

δ

is replaced by the salience function,

σv.

In this way, salience perception

directly distorts how payo dierences are perceived. Outcome dierences are summed both
within categories and across categories. Bordalo et al. (2012) refer to a decision maker who

local thinker. In a similar spirit, we refer to an economic agent
who chooses according to (3) as a categorical thinker.
chooses according to (2) as a

For a choice between two independent monetary lotteries, we let the category vectors
correspond to the minimal state space in the Bordalo et al. (2012) salience theory (i.e., each
pair of outcomes in a category vector corresponds to a `state' in the Bordalo et al. (2012)
minimal state space). In that case, our model of category-dependent risk preferences reduces
to the Bordalo et al. (2012) model when there is only one category of outcomes and the onestage salience weighting in (3) is replaced by the two-stage ranking-then-weighting process
assumed by Bordalo et al. (2012). More generally, within any category, we let the category
vectors correspond to the minimal state space in Bordalo et al.

(2012).

Our approach

generates novel predictions regarding the relationship between risk preferences for money and
for dierent consumer goods, as well as for deviations from expected utility theory for money
and for goods. Both of these predictions have empirical support discussed in Sections 3 and
4, which cannot be explained by expected utility theory with multi-dimensional outcomes
(Karni, 1979; DeJarnette, 2017).

1 Although model (3) as written applies to binary choice, it can be straightforwardly extended to larger
choice sets using an approach such as that suggested in the online appendix to Bordalo et al. (2012).
2 In general (3) allows for category-dependent salience functions, σ which may be natural when comparing
c
outcomes across categories that have dierent units (such as the weight of a bag of potato chips versus the
price of the bag). This generality will not be necessary in our subsequent analysis. To constrain the model,
we use a category-independent salience function and we accordingly drop the c subscript in what follows.
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2.2

Extension to Multiple Alternatives

Representation (4) can be extended from a model of binary choice to simultaneous choice
among multiple alternatives. A simple approach is for a categorical thinker to evaluate a
lottery

Lk

from choice set

L

as in (5)

V(Lk |L) =

1 X XX
σc (xick , xicj )[u(xkic ) − u(xjic )]pic
n L ∈L c∈C i∈c

(5)

j

Under (5), a categorical thinker evaluates each lottery according to the salient comparisons of
that lottery's payos with the background context (the other alternatives in the choice set).
Formula (5) computes salient comparisons across outcomes, across categories, and across
lotteries. When the choice set contains only two alternatives, (5) is equivalent to (4).

2.3

Properties of Salience Perception

The salience function,

σv,

is assumed to satisfy two basic properties: (i) ordering and (ii)

diminishing absolute sensitivity. Ordering implies that the perceptual system is more sensitive to larger dierences in outcomes when the outcomes with the smaller dierence are
contained in the interval spanned by the outcomes with the larger dierence. Diminishing
Absolute Sensitivity (DAS) implies that for a xed absolute dierence, the perceptual system
is more sensitive to larger ratios. The DAS property is rooted in the Weber-Fechner law in
psychology. Bordalo et al. (2012) justify this assumption in their salience model, noting As
in Weber's law of diminishing sensitivity, in which a change in luminosity is perceived less
intensely if it occurs at a higher luminosity level, the local thinker perceives less intensely
payo dierences occurring at high (absolute) payo levels (p. 1254). Citing evidence from
McCoy and Platt (2005), Bordalo et al. add that visual perception and risk taking seem to
be connected at a more fundamental neurological level (p. 1254-1255). In the appendix we
show one way that this intuition can be made more precise.
The DAS property of salience perception has also been used in models of salience-based
choice to explain ambiguity aversion (Leland, Schneider, & Wilcox, 2019), present bias (Prelec and Loewenstein, 1991), and an attraction to consumer products with high quality-price
ratios (Bordalo et al., 2013a). We employ the following denition based on Bordalo et al.
(2012, 2013a):

Denition 1: (Salience Function):
1
2
bounded function, σ(xic , xic ) is a
1.

Ordering:

If

A non-negative, continuous, symmetric and

salience function
0

0

[xic1 , xic2 ] ⊂ [xic1 , xic2 ],

then

if the following two properties hold:
0

0

σ(xic1 , xic2 ) < σ(xic1 , xic2 ).
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2.

Diminishing Absolute Sensitivity (DAS): For all xicj > 0,  > 0, and for all Lj

∈L,

σ(xic1 + , xic2 + ) < σ(xic1 , xic2 ).
One other property of salience perception that is natural to assume is the following:

Increasing Proportional Sensitivity (IPS):
all

For all

xicj > 0, α > 1,xic1 6= xic2

and for

Lj ∈ L, σ(αxic1 , αxic2 ) > σ(xic1 , xic2 ).
Increasing Proportional Sensitivity (IPS) implies that for a xed ratio, the perceptual

system is more sensitive to larger absolute dierences. The IPS property was explicitly assumed by Prelec and Loewenstein (1991) for the perception of payos, probabilities, and
time delays and it generates a preference for positively skewed lotteries when applied to
the Bordalo et al.

(2012) salience theory.

It has also received empirical support in the

marketing literature by Pandelaere et al. (2011) and Wertenbroch (2007) who observe IPS
for numerical and monetary stimuli.

More broadly, IPS generates one of the central im-

plications of salience theory  a preference for positively skewed lotteries. A preference for
positive skewness (attraction to low-probability, low-cost, high-payo lotteries) can explain
the popularity of state-run lotteries, the favorite-longshot bias in race-track betting (Golec
and Tamarkin, 1998), the over-valuation of IPO's, growth stocks, and other positively skewed
nancial assets (Barberis and Huang, 2008; Bordalo et al., 2013b), and the motivation for
bargain hunting on eBay.

However, the determinants of skewness preference are not well

understood. Salience theory provides a psychologically grounded account of skewness preference in decision making. Moreover, using simple perceptual decision tasks, Rochanahastin
et al. (2018) provide experimental evidence indicating that visual perception satises IPS.
Interestingly, they also nd that experimental participants who more frequently violated IPS
in the perceptual task, were also signicantly less likely to select positively skewed lotteries
in a subsequent decision task, suggesting a link between visual perception and risky choice.
Such a link is consistent with the hypothesis used by McCoy and Platt (2005) to explain
their data that enhanced neuronal activity associated with risky rewards biases attention
spatially, marking large payos as salient for guiding behavior (p.

1226).

Although we

state DAS and IPS as natural assumptions of salience perception supported by both the
psychology and decision theory literature, our proofs in Sections 3 and 4 rely only on the
ordering property of salience perception which implies, for instance, that the comparison
between payos of $40 and $60 is less salient than the comparison between $1 and $100.
Bordalo et al.

(2012) proposed the following salience function that satises ordering,

DAS, and IPS, where

θ > 0:
σ(xic1 , xic2 ) =

|xic1 − x2ic |
.
|x1ic | + |x2ic | + θ
9

(6)

In their analysis of consumer choice, Bordalo et al.

(2013a) proposed a parameter-

free variant of (6) in which the salience function is dened as in (6) with
ensure the function is well-dened, they set

σ(0, 0) = 0.

θ

and to

To explain the fourfold pattern of

risk preferences and skewness preference more generally, the parameter
However, since (i)

θ = 0,

θ

must be positive.

does not have an intuitive psychological or economic interpretation, and

(ii) since the predictions of salience theory appear to be largely insensitive to variations in

θ

for a wide range of parameter values, all of our analyses that employ a specic salience

function will employ (6) with

θ=1

to illustrate the model.

We do not impose IPS as a required property of all salience functions since Bordalo et al.
(2013a) employ a salience function that does not satisfy IPS in their analysis of consumer
choice.

By not imposing IPS, our assumptions are consistent with theirs.

However, in

illustrating our approach, we employ salience function (6) which does satisfy IPS, thereby
retaining the prediction of skewness preference that is a central implication of salience theory.
In addition to satisfying ordering, DAS, and IPS, salience function (6) has another psychological foundation. In particular, in the appendix, we show that this measure of contrast
between two payos in a choice set coincides with a formula that has been used in computational neuroscience to measure visual contrast between two pixels in an image (e.g., Raj
et al., 2005; Frazor and Geisler, 2006; Chen and Blum, 2009).

3

Lotteries over Multidimensional Outcomes

In this section we apply CST to choices between lotteries over multidimensional outcomes.
In sections 3.1 and 3.2 we show how CST can explain existing empirical anomalies. In section
3.3, we conduct a new experiment that was designed to test an additional prediction of CST.

3.1

Risk Preferences over Money versus Goods

One recent puzzle regarding risk preferences was identied by DeJarnette (2017).

In his

experiment, subjects allocated either monetary credit or an equivalent value of goods from
Amazon.com over equally likely states (either two states, over which $20 was allocated,
or ten states, over which $100 was allocated).

Subjects allocating monetary credit were

required to spend their money on consumer goods at Amazon.com prior to leaving the
laboratory. DeJarnette observed signicantly more risk aversion over money than over goods.
For instance, subjects were more likely to allocate money equally across states and to allocate
a high-value consumer good to one of the states. DeJarnette did not provide an explanation
for his ndings but demonstrated that standard approaches could not explain his results.
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The categorical salience model in (4) oers a novel approach to DeJarnette's puzzle.
Since money is a single `category', choices involving money are represented as in the `Money
Frame' in Figure I. Since consumer goods typically span many dierent product categories,
if products are aligned by their categories, then these choices are represented as in the
`Consumer Goods Frame' in Figure I.

Figure I. Risk Preferences over Money versus Goods

Consider the case in which a consumer chooses between two bets on the toss of a coin. In
bet A, the consumer receives $15 if the coin lands heads and $5 if the coin lands tails. In bet
B, the consumer receives $10 regardless of whether the coin lands heads or tails. Formally,
for this `money frame', we have

L:= {L1 = A, L2 = B}, j ∈ {1, 2}, c ∈ {1}, i ∈ {1, 2}.

The

category-outcome vectors are:

2
2
1
1
} = {15, 10}, c21 := {x21
} = {5, 10}.
, x11
, x21
c11 := {x11

As there is only a single category, the probabilities are given by

(p11 , p21 ) = (0.5, 0.5).

Consider next the case in which a consumer chooses between a dierent pair of bets on the
toss of a coin. In bet A', the consumer receives `good 1' that is worth $15 to him if the coin
lands heads and he receives a good that he values at $5 (good 2) if the coin lands tails. In bet
B', the consumer receives a good that he values at $10 (good 3) regardless of the outcome of
the coin toss. Formally, for this `consumer goods frame', we have

j ∈ {1, 2}, c ∈ {1, 2, 3}, i ∈ {1, 2}. That is,

L:= {L1 = A0 , L2 = B0 },

there are three (goods) categories. The category-

outcome vectors are:

1
2
1
2
1
2
c11 := {x11
, x11
} = {15, 0}, c12 := {x12
, x12
} = {0, 0}, c13 := {x13
, x13
} = {0, 10},
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1
2
1
2
1
2
c21 := {x21
, x21
} = {0, 0}, c22 := {x22
, x22
} = {5, 0}, c23 := {x22
, x22
} = {0, 10}.

The probabilities for these category outcome vectors are

(p11 , p21 , p12 , p22 , p13 , p23 ) =

(0.5,0.5,0.5,0.5,0.5,0.5). Since outcomes are aligned by their categories, they are not directly
compared if they are in dierent categories. That is, receiving the $10 good is compared to
not receiving the $10 good (a payo of $0), rather than being compared to receiving the $15
good or the $5 good.
Under our running specication (where

u(x ) = x ,

and

σv

is given by (4) with

θ = 1),

the

CST model predicts that a categorical thinker allocates money evenly across states (due
to the DAS property of salience), but prefers to allocate goods asymmetrically due to the
ordering property of salience (e.g., a $15 item in one state and a $5 item in another state is

3

preferred to allocating a $10 item to each state) . Lotteries B and A' are bolded in Figure I
because they are the CST preferred lotteries. We follow the convention of bolding the CST
preferred option throughout the remainder of the paper.

Figure II. Risk Preferences with Payos Aligned by their Categories

For the choice between lotteries A and B over money in Figure II, the category outcomevectors are

c1 := (x , y)

and

c2 := (0,y).

For the choice between lotteries A' and B' over con-

sumer goods in Figure II, the category outcome vectors are
The probabilities for these category outcome vectors are

Denition 2:

c11 := (x ,0), c21 := (0, 0),c12 := (0, y).
(p11 , p21 , p12 ) = (0.5, 0.5, 1).

For the choices in Figure II, a categorical thinker exhibits

more risk
0

aversion toward money than toward dierent goods if A ∼|
˙ {A,B} B implies A0 ˙˙ |{A0 ,B0 } B .
Proposition 1: For the choices in Figure II, let x > y ≥ 0.5x and let u(x ) = x . Then a
categorical thinker exhibits more risk aversion toward money than toward dierent goods.
3 For

the money frame in Figure I, B%̇|L A as

|15−10|
|5−10|
(15 − 10)(0.5) + |5|+|10|+1
(5 −
|15|+|10|+1
h
|15−0|
|0−0|
|15|+|0|+1 (15 − 0)(0.5) + |0|+|0|+1 (0 −

10)(0.5) <
i
0. For the goods frame in Figure I, A0 %̇|L B0 as
0)(0.5) +
h
i h
i
|0−0|
|5−0|
|0−10|
|0−10|
|0|+|0|+1 (0 − 0)(0.5) + |5|+|0|+1 (5 − 0)(0.5) + |0|+|10|+1 (0 − 10)(0.5) + |0|+|10|+1 (0 − 10)(0.5) > 0.
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Proof:

For the choice of A versus B,

A∼|
˙ {A,B} B

if and only if

σ(0, y)[−y]0.5 + σ(x , y)[x − y]0.5 = 0.
For the choice of

A0

versus

0
B0 ,A0 ˙˙ |{A0 ,B0 } B

if and only if

σ(x ,0)[x ]0.5 > σ(0, y)[y].
0
σ(0, y)[y] = σ(x , y)[x − y], we have A0 ˙˙ |{A0 ,B0 } B if and only if
0
σ(x ,0)[x ]0.5 > σ(x , y)[x − y]. Let y = 0.5x . Then A0 ˙˙ |{A0 ,B0 } B if and only if
σ(x ,0)[x ]0.5 > σ(x , 0.5x )[0.5x ] which holds by ordering. For y > 0.5x , ordering implies
σ(x , 0.5x )[0.5x ] > σ(x , y)[x − y]. 
Substituting

3.2

The Common Ratio Eect for Money versus Goods

The categorical salience model in (3) also makes novel predictions for the classical common
ratio eect in choices under risk. The common ratio eect (Allais, 1953) is one of the bestknown and most robust systematic violations of expected utility theory. However, empirical
studies of the common ratio eect have traditionally used money as the outcome.

If the

outcomes are consumer goods in dierent categories, the CST predicts that the common
ratio eect will disappear.
The common ratio eect consists of a pair of choices that are related because the probabilities of prizes in the second choice scale down the probabilities of the same prizes in
the rst choice by a common ratio. In both versions of the common ratio eect in the top
portion of Figure III, one alternative yields an 80% chance of winning a $4z prize (Option
A), either in cash or in the form of a consumer good that the decision maker values at $4z,
for some constant

z > 0,

and the other alternative yields $3z with certainty (Option B). In

the bottom portion of Figure III, the decision maker chooses between a 20% chance of the
same $4z prize in Choice 1 (Option C) and a 25% chance of winning the $3z prize from
Choice 1 (Option D).
A decision maker exhibits the common ratio eect by choosing 3z with certainty over
an 80% chance of 4z, and also choosing a 20% chance of 4z over a 25% chance of 3z. This
pattern of behavior violates EU and explaining it has been one of the primary motivations
behind alternative theories of choice under risk.
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Figure III. The Common Ratio Eect with Payos Aligned by their Categories

Figure III displays the category outcome vectors for the common ratio lotteries, along
with the probability that each category outcome vector is randomly selected. For the money
frame in Figure III, these probabilities correspond to the state probabilities in the minimal
state space of the Bordalo et al. (2012) model given that the lotteries are statistically independent. Bordalo et al. (2012, p.1254) note that the minimal state space can be identied by
the set of distinct payo combinations that occur with positive probability. They note that
for statistically independent lotteries, the minimal state space is the product space induced
by the lotteries' marginal distributions over payos. Importantly, the minimal state space is
uniquely dened and so leaves no degrees of freedom for how probabilities are assigned. For
instance, in the choice between options C and D in Figure III, the minimal state space assigns
probability 0.05 (0.20

×

0.25) to category-outcome vector (4z, 3z), probability 0.15 (0.20

0.75) to category-outcome vector (4z, 0), probability 0.20 (0.25
vector (0, 3z), and probability 0.60 (0.75

×

×

× 0.80) to category-outcome

0.80) to category-outcome vector (0, 0).

In the money frame, the outcomes are in a single category (money). In the consumer
goods frame, the outcomes span two product categories (Good 1 and Good 2). Since outcomes are aligned by their categories in (3), the comparison between a payo worth 4z and a
payo worth 3z is not cued in the choice between A' and B' since these outcomes are in different categories. As a consequence, the 4z payo from Good 1 under lottery A' is compared
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to a zero payo from not receiving Good 1 under lottery B'. Since the category-outcome
vector (4z,0) is salient in both choice sets {A', B'} and {C', D'}, the CST model in (3)
predicts consistent choices of A' over B' and C' over D' for lotteries over consumer goods. In
contrast, since the category-outcome vector (0,3z) that favors B is salient in choice set {A,B}
and the category-outcome vector (4z,0) that favors C is salient in choice set {C,D}, CST
predicts the decision maker will exhibit the common ratio eect in the money frame. Hence,
CST predicts the classical common ratio eect in the money frame but predicts consistent
risk preferences in the consumer goods frame.
Under EU from (1), a decision maker is predicted to exhibit consistent risk preferences for
both money and equally valued goods. In addition, salience theory from (2) aligns outcomes
by salient states rather than by categories. Since both the money lotteries and the consumer
goods lotteries in each choice set are statistically independent, salience theory predicts that
both choices are framed as in the `money frame' in Figure III. Hence, salience theory predicts
that a decision maker displays the same behavior under risk toward money as toward goods.
Recently, Arroyos-Calvera et al. (2018) tested the common ratio eect with money and
consumer goods in an incentivized experiment.

They used 10 objects for the goods and

elicited subject valuations for each object. To test the common ratio eect with goods, they
presented subjects with pairs of goods such that their valuations approximately preserved
the 3:4 ratio of the monetary prizes that has also been used in the classical common ratio experiments (e.g., Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). They report, we manipulated object
similarity by using some pairs of goods that had common characteristics (alarm clocks with
dierent additional features), and other pairs where the characteristics were rather dierent
and more dicult to compare (such as an airbed and a toaster, or an alarm clock and a suitcase.) (p. 3). They observed the standard common ratio eect for monetary consequences
but note that it was signicantly weakened for similar goods and that it disappeared for dissimilar goods. Each of these ndings is in line with the predictions of the CST: The common
ratio eect was strongest in the money frame, it disappeared in the frame where the goods
were clearly in dierent categories, and it was weakened but present for similar goods, which
plausibly some subjects categorized as dierent and some classied in the same category.
Note that CST not only predicts the common ratio eect will disappear when the items
are in dierent categories, it predicts this to happen in a particular direction: choices are
predicted to shift toward the riskier lottery in the choice with a certain outcome. As predicted
by CST, Arroyos-Calvera et al. (2018) report, The stronger tendency for people to choose
the risky alternative in the scaled up questions with goods may be at least partially driving

4

this. (p.3) . Formally, we have the following denition and result:

4 Under

the assumption that the Bordalo et al. (2012) minimal state space holds within categories, CST
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Denition 3:

5

A := (x , p; 0, 1 − p), B := (y,1),
A0 := (x , rp; 0, 1 − rp), B0 := (y, r ;0, 1 − r ),where r ∈ (0, 1) and E[A] ≥ E[B]. A categorical
0
thinker exhibits the common ratio eect if A ∼|
˙ {A,B} B implies A0 ˙˙ |{A0 ,B0 } B .
Proposition 2: Let σ(0, 0) = 0 and u(x ) = x . Then for the common ratio lotteries
Consider the four lotteries in Figure IV :

shown in Figure IV ), a categorical thinker exhibits the common ratio eect for money, but
does not exhibit the common ratio eect for choices over goods in dierent categories.
(

Proof:

For the choice of A versus B in the money frame (shown in Figure IV),

σ(0, y)[−y](1 − p) + σ(x , y)[x − y]p = 0.
0
0
0
0 ˙
choice of A versus B in the money frame, A ˙ |{A0 ,B0 } B

A ∼|
˙ {A,B} B

if and only if
For the

if and only if

σ(x , y)[x − y](r 2 p) + σ(x ,0)[x ](rp − r 2 p) > σ(0, y)[y](r − r 2 p).
Substituting

0
σ(x , y)[x − y]p = σ(0, y)[−y](1 − p),A0 ˙˙ |{A0 ,B0 } B

if and only if

σ(0, y)[y](1 − p)r + σ(x ,0)[x ](p − rp) > σ(0, y)[y](1 − rp),
which holds if and only if

σ(x ,0)[x ]p > σ(0, y)[y].

Since

E[A] ≥ E[B],

by ordering of

σ,

the categorical thinker exhibits the common ratio eect for money.

A ∼|
˙ {A,B} B
if and only if σ(x ,0)[x ]p = σ(0, y)[y] which cannot hold due to the ordering property of σ and
˙
since E[A] ≥ E[B]. Instead, we have σ(x ,0)[x ]p > σ(0, y)[y] which implies both A ˙ |{A,B} B
0
0 ˙
and A ˙ |{A0 ,B0 } B and thus the categorical thinker does not exhibit the common ratio eect
for goods in dierent categories. 
For the choice of A versus B in the consumer goods frame (shown in Figure IV),

It is also the case more generally (i.e., for any utility function) that the common ratio

eect does not hold for consumer goods in dierent categories and instead a categorical
thinker conforms to expected utility theory over goods, as observed by Arroyos-Calvera et
al.

(2018).

While it is the case that a suciently concave utility function could produce

consistent risk-averse choices over goods, the salient comparison that drives this choice favors
the riskier lottery which will produce a systematic bias toward that lottery, relative to the

does not explain all features of the experiment by Arroyos-Calvera et al. (2018). In particular, they nd
greater risk-seeking for the choice between C and D in Figure III than for the choice between C0 and D0 .
However, CST predicts that a consumer indierent between C and D would choose C0 over D0 . If one instead
develops CST assuming that choice are represented by minimal frames within categories as formalized in
Leland et al. (2019) and employs their salience weighted utility model that operates over frames, then CST
predicts greater risk-seeking in the choice between C and D than in the choice between C0 and D0 . That
approach preserves the other predictions in this paper. However, to deviate as little as possible from the
standard salience theory of Bordalo et al. (2012), we assume choices are represented by (4) and that choices
within categories are represented by the minimal state space.
5 The minimal state space for the choice between A' and B' over monetary outcomes in Figure IV uniquely
assigns probability r2 p (rp × r) to category-outcome vector (x, y ), probability rp(1 − r) (rp × (1 − r)) to
category-outcome vector (x, 0), probability r(1 − rp) (r × (1 − rp)) to category-outcome vector (0, y ), and
probability (1 − rp)(1 − r) ((1 − rp) × (1 − r)) to category-outcome vector (0, 0).

16

true risk preferences of the categorical thinker (in the absence of salience distortions).

6

Figure IV. The Common Ratio Eect with Payos Aligned by their Categories

3.3

Experiment on Risk Preferences Across Categories

To further investigate the predictions of CST, we conducted an experiment involving tradeos
within categories and across categories. One hundred and fty four subjects participated:

7

fty-eight participants were female and ninety-six were male. All subjects were individuals
on The University of Alabama campus who passed by a rolling cart that we arranged with
four types of snacks: a regular size pack of m & m's, a pack of six Oreo cookies, a small bag
of Lay's potato chips, and a pack of Cheez-it crackers. The options were chosen to represent
dierent categories of snacks (chocolate, cookies, potato chips, crackers), and to increase
the likelihood that there would be two snacks that a subject liked.

6A

The sample size was

general statement that categorical salience theory satises the independence axiom is not possible since
the perceptual relation is choice set dependent. The categorical thinker prefers A to B if and only if they
prefer A' to B', regardless of whether E[A] ≥ E[B] or not, where these values are as given in Denition 3. To
see this, note A ˙˙ |{A,B} B⇐⇒ σ(x ,0)[x ]p = σ(0, y)[y] ⇐⇒rσ(x ,0)[x ]p = r σ(0, y)[y] ⇐⇒A0 ˙˙ |{A0 ,B0 } B 0 .
7 We made no attempt to recruit more males than females. The discrepancy between the number of male
and female participants might reect that the female participants we asked to participate declined more
frequently than the male participants.
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determined so as to yield 80% power for identifying an eect at the 5% signicance level for

8

a one-tailed test

under the prior that the true proportion of risky cross-category choices is

60% and the true proportion of risky within-category choices is 40%.
We employed a between-subjects design with two treatments.
choice between two lotteries over snacks. In the

within-category

Subjects made a single

treatment, subjects chose

between a safe (S) lottery oering a 9/10 chance of one unit of a snack and a riskier (R)
lottery oering a 5/10 chance of 2 units of the same snack. In the

cross-category

treatment,

subjects chose between an S lottery oering a 9/10 chance of one unit of a snack and a R
lottery oering a 5/10 chance of 2 units of a dierent snack. The probabilities were chosen
so that they could be transparently presented and implemented with a ten-sided die.
Assignment to treatment was alternated.

9

For within-category choices, we rst asked sub-

jects to identify their favorite snack out of the four snack choices available. For cross-category
choices, we rst asked subjects to identify their two favorite types of snacks. Subjects were
informed that their compensation would be in snacks so that they had an incentive to truthfully reveal their preferences. For the cross-category choices we randomized between using
the snack the subject picked rst as the safe lottery and using the snack the subject picked
rst for the riskier lottery.

This randomization was done prior to data collection so that

we knew which condition to implement and could do so eciently as potential participants

10

approached the rolling cart.

Representations for the choices in the experiment under CST are uniquely determined

11

by the minimal state space and are shown in Figure V

. In the gure, there are two snacks,

where one unit of each snack brings a utility of 1 and 2 units of each snack brings a utility of
2. For these choices, CST (as specied in equations (4) and (6) with

θ = 1) predicts subjects

will exhibit greater risk aversion in the within-category treatment than in the cross-category
treatment.

In particular, CST predicts that the comparison of getting two units in the

cross-category choice will be more salient than the comparison of getting two units in the

8 The

one-tailed test is the appropriate statistical test since CST makes clear directional predictions of
greater risk tolerance in cross-category choices and a dierence in the opposite direction would not support
CST.
9 If a subject approached the rolling cart while the previous subject was present the same treatment was
applied so as to avoid confusion and to mask the purpose of the experiment. However, an equal number of
subjects participated in each treatment.
10 One researcher administered the experiment while another recorded the data which included the treatment, whether the subject chose to go for 1 snack with a 90% chance (safe lottery) or 2 snacks with a 50%
chance (risky lottery), and the subject's sex (male or female).
11 The minimal state space for the within-category choices in Figure V uniquely assigns probability 0.45
(0.90 × 0.50) to category-outcome vector (1, 2), probability 0.45 (0.90 × 0.50) to category-outcome vector
(1, 0), probability 0.05 (0.10 × 0.50) to category-outcome vector (0, 2), and probability 0.05 (0.10 × 0.50)
to category-outcome vector (0, 0).
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within-category choice (since

0.5σ(0, 2) > 0.45σ(1, 2) + 0.05σ(0, 2)).12

Under our running

parametric specication, the safe (S) lottery is chosen in the within-category choice, but the
risky (R) lottery is chosen in the cross-category choice. Hence, CST predicts a shift toward
greater risk-taking in the cross-category choices.

Figure V. Risky Choices Within and Across Categories

We nd that 62.3% of the subjects in the within-category treatment selected the S lottery
indicating a typical level of risk aversion. However, 46.8% of the subjects in the cross-category
treatment opted for the S lottery. Thus, observed behavior shifts in the direction predicted
by CST and the dierence is statistically signicant (p = 0.02619, one tailed two-sample
proportions test).
The results are summarized in Table I. The rst row displays the percentage of R lottery
choices in the within-category treatment.

The second row displays the percentage for R

lottery choices in the cross-category treatment.

Total (% R)
Within-Category

0.377

Cross-Category

0.532

Table I. Proportion of Risky Choices Across Treatments

12 One

caveat is that this prediction is derived under the assumption that the two snacks are valued equally.
While the prediction continues to hold if the snacks are valued approximately equally, it need not hold if
there is a strong preference for one snack over the other. For this reason we selected four types of snacks
and asked participants to pick their favorite two for the cross-category choices, supposing that more snacks
to choose from increases the chances that subjects would nd multiple snacks they liked. We also selected
the snacks to be comparable in retail value.
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4

Categorization and Portfolio Choice

We next consider implications of CST for the use of diversication strategies in consumer
choice and portfolio choice.

4.1

Variety-Seeking in Simultaneous versus Sequential Choice

One of the more puzzling anomalies in the consumer behavior literature is the diversication
bias: Simonson (1990) and Read and Loewenstein (1995) both nd greater variety seeking
behavior in simultaneous than in sequential choices.
Loewenstein tested this behavior on Halloween night.

In of their experiments, Read and
Children trick-or-treating between

two adjacent houses were either given a single choice between a milky way candy bar and
a musketeers bar at each house (sequential choice condition), or a choice of two candy
bars (which could be two milky way, two musketeers, or one of each) at one of the houses
(simultaneous choice condition).

Read and Loewenstein found that in the simultaneous

choice condition, all children chose one of each candy bar, whereas only 48% of children in
the sequential choice condition did so.
The puzzling choices observed by Read and Loewenstein can be simply reconciled by
CST. Figure VIII depicts the CST representation of these choices in the simultaneous and
sequential choice conditions. Note that in the simultaneous choice, diminishing sensitivity
implies that the downside of not obtaining any of one candy outweighs the upside of obtaining
two of the other candy. Hence, CST implies the use of the diversication heuristic in the
simultaneous choice for any salience function. In the sequential choice, if the two bars have
roughly the same utility, CST predicts indierence in these choices. Indeed, the nding that
48% of the children chose one of each candy in the sequential choice is consistent with the
implication of CST that the children were indierent in the sequential choices and chose
randomly.

Figure VIII. The Diversication Heuristic
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A CST agent with

u(x ) = x

chooses one of each item in the simultaneous choice but

is indierent between each item in the sequential choices in Figure VIII if the following
inequality holds:

σ(1, 0) − σ(1, 2) > 0.
The above inequality follows generally from diminishing sensitivity and symmetry of

σ.

Hence, the CST agent chooses to diversify in the simultaneous choice, and chooses randomly
in the sequential choice, consistent with the ndings of Read and Loewenstein.

4.2

The 1/N Rule in Portfolio Choice

Benartzi and Thaler (2001) nd evidence consistent with a 1/N diversication heuristic in
portfolio allocation decisions. Under this heuristic, given a xed amount of money to allocate
to N dierent assets, a signicant fraction of people allocate an equal amount to each asset.
This form of diversication can deviate from a truly diversied portfolio as we illustrate
below.
The CST model also generates a novel prediction for portfolio choice - that behavioral
investors will systematically deviate from allocating an equal amount of resources

states, by instead allocating an equal amount of resources across categories.

across

The CST thus

provides a formal framework for contrasting the predictions of expected utility theory with
those of the diversication heuristic.
Naive diversication is an empirical puzzle for both leading rational and behavioral decision theories of choice under risk.

In independent work, Koszegi and Matejka (2019)

developed a model of choice simplication and Landry and Webb (2020) developed a neuroeconomic model of multi-attribute choice, both of which generate behavior consistent with
the diversication heuristic. However, these models were not developed as general models
of choice under risk and so do not explain our other ndings or the classical risky choice
anomalies such as the fourfold pattern of risk preferences (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992).

4.2.1 Experiment on Diversication across Categories versus States
We conducted an online experiment using Amazon Mechanical Turk

13

to explore the com-

peting predictions of true diversication implied by EU for any risk-averse agent with 'naive'
diversication implied by CST for the same investment decision. Experimental subjects each

13 We

used a lab-in-the-eld procedure for the risky choices across categories experiment given the complexity of delivering non-monetary payments in an online experiment.
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participated in one portfolio allocation decision, involving either two states and two cate-

14

gories or three states and three categories. In the two-state, two-category decision

, subjects

were asked to allocate 12 tokens across two dierent assets, where each asset yields a payo
in one of two equally likely states. In particular, subjects were shown the table on the left
side of Figure IX. Subjects were informed that each experimental currency unit (ECU) was
worth $0.05. That is, if Outcome 1 occurred and all 12 tokens were allocated to Asset B, that
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subject would earn 36 ECU's ($1.80).

To allocate their tokens, subjects were required to

increase or decrease their allocation to each asset by changing one token at a time, with the
initial allocation set to 0. The experimental software enforced the requirement that exactly
12 tokens must be allocated before that subject could proceed. In the three-asset, three-state
portfolio decision, a dierent group of subjects was asked to allocate 15 tokens across three
dierent assets, where each asset yields a payo in one of three equally likely states.

In

particular, subjects were shown the table on the right side of Figure IX. For simplicity, we
refer to Asset A as shown in the gure as the safe asset in both conditions, and Asset B
as shown in the gure as the risky asset in both conditions, but this terminology was not
used with the subjects. The actual order of the rows and columns were randomized across
subjects in both conditions.

Figure IX. Allocation Decisions for Two Assets (Left) and Three Assets (Right)
Expected utility theory predicts that

any

risk-averse agent will allocate 9 tokens to Asset

1 and 3 tokens to Asset 2 in the two-asset condition as both assets have the same expected

14 To

keep the experimental design simple, we do not distinguish assets from categories in the experiment,
implicitly assigning dierent assets to dierent categories. This might be particularly natural, for instance,
if the assets are categorized by their riskiness. In our experiment, the assets can be ranked in precisely that
way according to second-order stochastic dominance, as the assets are mean-preserving spreads.
15 These stakes are consistent with the amount commonly paid in experiments conducted via Amazon
Mechanical Turk. Subjects also received an additional $1 payment for participating.
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payo and that particular allocation will perfectly equalize payos across the two states. In
addition, EU predicts that any risk-seeking agent will allocate all 12 tokens to Asset B. Only
in the knife-edge case in which the decision maker is exactly risk-neutral does EU not make a
clear prediction: A risk-neutral EU agent will be indierent between all possible allocations.
In contrast, under our running parametric specication in (5, 6) with

u(x) = x

and

θ = 1,

a

categorical thinker uniquely chooses the equal split allocation (six tokens to each asset) out
of the 13 possible allocation strategies.
For the three-asset condition, EU predicts that

any

risk-averse agent will allocate 10

tokens to Asset A, 3 tokens to Asset B, and 2 tokens to Asset C, as each asset has the same
expected payo and that particular allocation will perfectly equalize payos across states.
In addition, EU predicts that any risk-seeking agent will allocate 15 tokens to Asset C. A
risk-neutral EU agent will be indierent between all possible allocations. In contrast, under
our running parametric specication in (5, 6) with

u(x) = x and θ = 1, a categorical thinker

uniquely chooses the equal split allocation (ve tokens to each asset) out of the 136 possible
allocation strategies.
The CST prediction of an equal allocation across assets is distinct from the predictions
of the original salience theory of Bordalo et al. (2012). Under the original salience theory,
an agent constructs the minimal state space from the support of the overall distribution
of lottery payos. To simplify the problem, it is sucient to show that under the original
salience theory, the optimal CST allocation is dominated by the EU allocation.

Under

the optimal CST allocation (consistent with the 1/N rule), the portfolio pays 12 ECU's
or 24 ECU's with equal probability, whereas the optimal EU allocation pays 18 ECU's
with certainty. The minimal state space under original salience theory is then (12,18) and
(24,18) and the original salience theory predicts that the EU allocation is chosen over the
CST allocation for an agent with any salience function satisfying diminishing sensitivity and
any linear or concave utility function. Similarly, for the three-asset allocation decision, the
optimal CST portfolio pays 15 ECU's, 30 ECU's, or 45 ECU's with equal probability, whereas
the optimal EU allocation pays 30 ECU's with certainty.

The minimal state space under

original salience theory is then (15,30), (45,30), and (30,30) and the original salience theory
predicts that the EU allocation is chosen over the CST allocation for an agent with any
salience function satisfying diminishing sensitivity and any linear or concave utility function.
The CST prediction is also distinct from that of cumulative prospect theory (CPT) due to
Tversky and Kahneman (1992). Using the value function and probability weighting function
from Tversky and Kahneman (1992) and the parameter estimates from the classic experimental studies of CPT cited in Neilson and Stowe (2002, p. 36) (Tversky and Kahneman
(1992), Camerer and Ho (1994), or Wu and Gonzalez (1996)), we nd that a CPT agent
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prefers the optimal EU allocation over the optimal CST allocation for both the two-asset
and three-asset allocation decisions.
The CST further predicts there to be a framing eect in portfolio choice decisions. In
the format presented in many retirement savings plans in which participants are asked to allocate their wealth across dierent asset categories, a CST agent will systematically deviate
from true diversication (equalizing wealth across states) in the direction of naive diversication (equalizing wealth across categories).

However, CST also provides a remedy to

this sub-optimal investment bias: If participants are presented with the distribution of their
portfolio returns across states, as shown for instance in Figure X, a CST agent with linear
(or concave) utility will prefer Allocation 1 (corresponding to the optimal EU allocation)
in both portfolio decisions for any salience function. In our experiment, the subjects who
faced the two-asset (three-asset) allocation decision in Figure IX were subsequently asked to
make a binary choice between two lotteries shown in Figure X, one option corresponding to
the distribution implied by the 1/N allocation for two (three) assets (Allocation 2) and the
other option corresponding to true diversication (Allocation 1).

Since only the portfolio

distribution ultimately matters, a CST agent with concave utility (i.e., who has preferences
for diversication across states) but who allocates payos equally across categories would
benet from a policy which displayed the distribution of portfolio returns, thereby mitigating
the bias due to categorization.

16

Figure X. Asset Allocation with Salient States

16 After

making their portfolio allocation decisions, subjects completed a risk-preference elicitation task
based on Eckel and Grossman (2002) and the cognitive reection test (Frederick, 2005).
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4.2.2 Results
A total of 192 subjects completed the study, of whom 88 were randomly assigned to the

17

two-asset condition and 104 were randomly assigned to the three-asset condition.

In both

conditions, there was a wide dispersion of asset allocation choices. In the two-asset allocation
condition, there are thirteen possible allocations (allocating any integer between 0 and 12
tokens to the safe asset). Figure XI shows the frequency of allocation decisions for the twoasset condition. Despite the variety of chosen allocations, the modal response was correctly
predicted by CST (chosen by 19 of 88 subjects), whereas only 5 subjects chose the allocation
predicted by EU for any risk-averse agent (EU-RA) allocating 9 tokens to the safe asset.
Only two subjects chose the EU risk-seeking strategy (EU-RS) of purchasing only the risky
asset. We also note that 13 subjects chose what one could term a 'naive' risk-averse strategy
by allocating all 12 tokens to the safe asset. One could more generally categorize subjects as
approximately CST or approximately EU-RA if their chosen allocation was one token away
from the CST and EU-RA predictions, respectively. Under this categorization, 35 subjects
are approximately CST while 30 are approximately EU-RA in their allocation decisions.

Figure XI. Frequency of Choices in Two-Asset Allocation Condition
The results for the three-asset allocation condition are even more supportive of CST.
In that condition, there are 136 dierent possible allocation decisions.

17 The

Despite the wide

sample size was set at 200, but the data was not recorded for one subject who started but did not
complete the study. Seven other subjects were dropped from the data for violating the instructions by trying
to complete the experiment twice or by entering a dierent subject ID from the one they were assigned. The
number of subjects diered between the two conditions due to the random assignment. The objective of this
study is descriptive, therefore the sample size was not based on power calculations, unlike the risky choice
across categories experiment where a treatment eect was being measured.
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dispersion of chosen allocations, as show in Figure XII, the modal response was predicted
by CST (chosen by 17 of 104 subjects). No subject chose the EU-RA allocation strategy.
There were 11 subjects who chose the 'naive' risk-averse strategy by only purchasing the safe
asset. No subject followed the EU-RS strategy and no other allocation strategy was chosen
by more than ve subjects.

Figure XII. Frequency of Choices in Three-Asset Allocation Condition
Of the 88 subjects in the two-asset allocation condition, 51 chose Allocation 1 on the
left side of Figure X. Behavior in the three-asset condition is even more stark. There, 79 of
the 104 subjects chose Allocation 1 on the right side of Figure X. In both conditions, the
majority choice is predicted by the CST and EU-RA models.

5

Categorization and Insurance

Insurance contracts and warranties are often highly specialized. For instance, it is common
to see insurance companies oer ood insurance, re insurance, and earthquake insurance,
rather than oering a single comprehensive insurance policy against natural disasters. There
is also evidence that consumers are willing to pay more for two specialized insurance policies
covering mutually exclusive risks than they will pay for a single policy covering both of those
risks. In a classic study, Johnson et al. (1993) found that the total amount respondents were
willing to pay for two life insurance policies due to death from air travel - terrorism insurance
and non-terrorism related mechanical failure, exceeded the amount they would pay for ight
insurance that applied to any cause of death.
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The CST predicts such eects to occur. Consider the choice problem given in Figure VI.
In the left hand side of the gure, a consumer chooses whether to purchase two actuarially
fair insurance policies to insure a potential $1000 loss.
where the ood occurs with probability

p.

One policy is for ood insurance,

The other policy is for earthquake insurance

where the earthquake occurs with probability

q.

For simplicity, we assume as in Gennaioli

and Shleifer (2010) that at most one disaster occurs. In the right hand side of Figure VI, a
consumer chooses whether to purchase a single insurance policy that applies to all natural
disasters.

Clearly this policy applies more broadly than to just ooding and earthquakes

but in our illustration we let these be the only two risks so that the two choices in Figure
VI have the same expected cost.

Figure VI. Categorized versus Comprehensive Insurance

For the choices in Figure VI, CST predicts that a consumer will be more inclined to
purchase the ood and earthquake insurance policies than the natural disaster insurance
since the smaller costs of the separately categorized insurance policies are less salient than
the larger cost of the single-category policy. To illustrate, let
VI and let

u(x ) = x .

p = 0.01 and q = 0.02 in Figure

Then a CST consumer would choose A over B in the choice on the left

(insuring against the loss by purchasing ood insurance and earthquake insurance) if the
following inequality holds:

[σ(−10, −1000) − σ(−10, 0)](9.9) > [σ(−20, 0) − σ(−20, −1000)](19.6).
In contrast, a CST consumer would choose B over A in the choice on the right (choosing
not to purchase natural disaster insurance) if the following inequality holds:

σ(−30, −1000) < σ(−30, 0).
Under our running parametric specication (salience function (6) with
the above inequalities hold.

27

θ = 1),

both of

6

Categorization and Contracts

We next consider an application of CST to contract theory. In practice, employment contracts often feature non-monetary incentives such as bonus paid vacation time for good
performance. A eld experiment by Lockwood et al. (2010) found that a contingent time o
(CTO) plan that rewarded high productivity with paid time o led to an increase in productivity at a manufacturing plant that persisted when productivity was measured six months
after the intervention was implemented.

From the perspective of neoclassical economics,

monetary incentives should dominate non-monetary incentives of equivalent value because
money has option value (Jerey, 2003) and employers are unlikely to know an employee's
preference-maximizing choice for how to use that money.
From the perspective of CST, non-monetary incentives provide another category of outcomes in addition to wages, which due to diminishing sensitivity of salience perception, could
incentivize agents to work even more than a marginally higher wage. To illustrate, consider
a principal-agent problem with a risk-neutral principal and a CST agent where the agent

e ∈ {0, 1}, and the principal wants to induce the agent to
work (e = 1) rather than shirk (e = 0). There are two possible output levels for the principal,
H and L, denoting high and low output, respectively. States are denoted {s0 , s1 }, indicating
the output level for eort levels 0 and 1, respectively, where s0 , s1 ∈ {L, H}. The probability
of each state, pes , depends on the agent's eort level where p1H > p0H .

chooses between two eort levels,

To induce the agent to work, the principal chooses between two contracts. Contract A
uses only monetary incentives. It pays the agent

w

if output is low and it pays

output is high. Contract B pays the agent a base salary,

w,

w >w

if

in every state, and it gives the

employee bonus paid time o (or some other non-monetary incentive) that has a monetary

w − w if the output is high. The agent has a cost of eort c(e) normalc(0) = 0 and c(1) = c. The two contracts are summarized from the agent's

value equivalent to
ized such that

perspective in Figure VII.
A CST agent with linear utility chooses to work

(e = 1)

under Contract A if

σ(w , w )(w − w )[(p0L )(p1H ) − (p0H )(p1L )] − σ(−c, 0)(c) > 0.
A CST agent with linear utility chooses to work

(e = 1)

under Contract B if

σ(w − w , 0)(w − w )[(p0L )(p1H ) − (p0H )(p1L )] − σ(−c, 0)(c) > 0.
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(7)

(8)

Figure VII. Contracts with Monetary and Non-Monetary Incentives

By diminishing absolute sensitivity,

σ(w , w ) = σ(w − w + w , 0 + w ) = σ(w − w + , ) < σ(w − w , 0).
Thus, for any salience function, the CST agent is more sensitive to the non-monetary
incentive than to a marginally higher wage. If the agent were indierent between working
and shirking under contract A, the agent would strictly prefer to work under contract B. If
the agent prefers to work under both contracts, the above analysis implies that the principal
could lower the non-monetary incentive under Contract B and thereby have a lower expected
payment than under Contract A but still induce the agent to work. This prediction also has
empirical support. Choi and Presslee (2016) conduct an experiment using a real-eort task to
investigate the performance eects of tangible (non-monetary) incentives versus cash rewards
and they nd a mediating role of categorization. They report: performance increases the
more participants categorize performance-contingent pay separately from salary.

29

7

Conclusion

We provided a generalization of salience theory called categorical salience theory (CST) to
risky choices over multidimensional outcomes.

In this richer setting, we derive two novel

predictions of CST in the context of choices between lotteries:

(i) Risk aversion will be

greater for money (or a single consumer good) than for dierent types of consumer goods (or
a combination of money and goods), and that (ii) one of the most robust empirical violations
of EU, the Allais common ratio eect, will disappear when the outcomes consist of dierent
types of goods (or a combination of money and goods).

These are strong predictions of

CST because (i) the predictions are systematic (the reverse predictions do not hold) and
(ii) the predictions are novel (they are not shared by alternative models). These predictions
are also supported by recent experimental results that on their own seem surprising (e.g.,
Arroyos-Calvera et al., 2018; DeJarnette, 2017), and by our lab-in-the-eld experiment on
risky choices across categories designed to test CST.
We demonstrated that CST oers explanations for empirical puzzles across a variety of
contexts including the higher willingness to pay for categorized insurance, the eectiveness
of non-monetary incentives in labor contracts, and greater variety seeking in simultaneous
than in sequential choice. Moreover, the same simple parametric specication is sucient
to explain each puzzle studied in this paper.

We also found that CST predicts majority

behavior consistent with naive diversication in portfolio choice in a new online experiment.
In each application, the predictions of CST are systematic and they are distinct from other
models of choice under risk.
The predictive success of CST is not derived from added exibility.
gorization of outcomes, CST generalizes the Bordalo et al.
adding parameters. Further, CST has

fewer

For a given cate-

(2012) salience model

without

parameters than cumulative prospect theory.

The original version of salience theory can explain the classical empirical phenomena that

18

prospect theory can also accommodate

, while CST delves into uncharted territory by link-

ing the basic concepts of salience perception and categorization to choices under risk.

18 Bordalo

et al. (2012) do demonstrate that salience theory can explain dierences in behavior toward
correlated and independent lottery payos and preference reversals between choice and pricing tasks that
also distinguish salience theory from cumulative prospect theory for monetary lotteries.
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Appendix
In this appendix we show that the measure of contrast between two payos in a choice set
given by equation (6) coincides with a measure of visual contrast between two pixels in an
image used in computational neuroscience. Raj et al. (2005), Frazor and Geisler (2006), and
Chen and Blum (2009) use the following formula to measure visual contrast between pixels
in an image (where

Li

is the luminous intensity of pixel

v
u
u
1
C = t PN

N
X

i=1 wi

L0 ≥ 0

In (9),

is a constant and

L>0

wi

i=1

i ):

(Li − L)2
.
(L + L0 )2

(9)

is a weighted average of the luminous intensities:

N
X

1

L = PN

wi

i=1

wi Li .

(10)

i=1

Proposition A.1 (Equivalence between visual contrast and payo contrast):

For N = 2 pixels, with luminous intensities L1 , L2 ≥ 0, and mean L = 21 (L1 + L2 ) > 0, the
formula for visual contrast in (9) is equivalent to the formula for payo salience in (6).

Proof:

Given

N = 2 , L1 , L2 ≥ 0,
s

C=

0.5



and

L = 0.5L1 + 0.5L2 ,

L1 − 0.5L1 − 0.5L2
0.5L1 + 0.5L2 + L0

2


+ 0.5

formula (9) reduces to:

L2 − 0.5L1 − 0.5L2
0.5L1 + 0.5L2 + L0

The above formula simplies to:

s
C=
where

L1 − L2
L1 + L2 + 2L0 )

θ ≡ 2L0 . @
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2
=

|L1 − L2 |
L1 + L2 + θ

2
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